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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
LEON G. PRITCHETT, Administrator of the Estate of Mary II. Pritchett,
Deceased
. .
'
Plaintiff-Respondent,
Case No.

vs.

10558

EQUITABLE LIFE & CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, a
corporation
Defendant-Appellant.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action brought by the administrator of
the estate of Mary H. Pritchett for benefits due under
a medical-surgical insurance policy and a family group
hospital expense policy issued by defendant.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Plaintiff was awarded a judgment against defendant for the sum of $3,513.00, plus costs.
1

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks to have the trial court's judgment
affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The two insurance policies in question were issued
to Mary H. Pritchett on November 28, 1962, at Phoenix, Arizona. (See Exhibits 3 and 4.) The applications
for the policies were prepared by defendant's agent,
N eH Bailey, at the home of the Pritchetts in Phoenix,
Arizona, shortly before the issuance of the policies. Present at this transaction were Mary H. Pritchett, her
husband, Leon G. Pritchett, and N e11 M. Bailey. (R.
62-64) The policies were issued and placed on a checkomatic plan so that every month defendant would deposit
a draft on the Pritchett bank account for payment of
the monthly premium. (R. 66) The first check was
given to Mrs. Bailey at the time that the applications
were fi11ed out and signed. (R. 67)
Thereafter, on May 20, 1963, Mary Pritchett was
admitted to the South Side District Hospital for an
exploratory operation. She was discharged from said
hospital on June 9, 1963, and thereafter entered the
L.D.S. Hospital in Salt Lake City, and was in said
hospital a total of 98 days between the time of entry
and her death, which occurred January 12, 1964. (R. 61,
Exhibits 1, 6) When Mary Pritchett was admitted to
the L.D.S. Hospital in June of 1963, fo11owing the
2

hospitalization in Phoenix, she was diagnosed as having
cancer, described as a "generalized metastatic carciHomatosis" from which she eventually died. The primary
lesion was never found. (R. 132)
The application blank attached to the medical-surgical policy contained the following question:
"9. Have you, or any member of your Family
Group to be insured, received medical or surgical
advice or treatment within the past three years?"

The answer was given as:
"Yes, as listed."
Beneath this question there was a small space for
an answer, and the following was given:
"2-28-62," under the heading of Nature of Illness or Accident, "Food poisoning, completely
O.K."

And under Doctor:
"McKeown, Phnx, Ariz."
The application blank for the Family Group Hospital Expense policy contained a question, 8B, which
asked:
"Have you or any dependent member of your
family ever been treated for, or to the best of your
knowledge and belief ever had any of the follow. ,,
mg:
followed by a lengthy list of diseases and disorders
of rnrious parts of the body, followed by the words:
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"If so, give full details."

In the small blank furnished for the details, the
date was given as "2-28-62," under Nature of Illness ,
Operation, or Accident,
"Food Poisoning, ate tainted meat at restau·
rant, completely recovered."
Under Doctor:
''McKeown.''
Address of Doctor:
"926 East McDowell Road, Phoenix, Ari-

zona."

9 ( b) asked if recovery was complete with no remaining complications, to which the answer "Yes" was
given.
Defendant claimed in its defense that the foregoing
answers to these questions on the application blanks
were falsely and fraudulently made by the applicant,
and that therefore defendant has a complete defense as
to said policies.
Doctor Vernon L. Stevenson, a local surgeon, testified as to the prior medical history of Mary Pritchett.
He stated that on November 24, 1961, he operated on
Mary Pritchett for a punctured duodenal ulcer, per·
forming a surgical procedure known as "gastrojejun·
ostomy." This operation involved circumventing the
ulcer area by bringing the loop of the small bowel up

4

and attaching it to the stomach and performing a new
opening from the stomach into the small intestine, bypassing the ulcer. He stated that Mrs. Pritchett made
a complete recovery from this operation. (R. 126, 127)
The doctor estimates that recovery was made in this
case after approximately three months. The doctor
next testified that in 1956 he operated on Mrs. Pritchett
for the removal of her gall bladder, and that at that time
he corrected some old adhesions from the prior stomach
operation. He testified that she made a complete recovery from the gall bladder operation. He stated that
from that time until February of 1962 Mrs. Pritchett
was well and had no medical problems, when she developed a gastro-enteritis from a food poisoning episode.
(R.127, 128) Dr. Stevenson testified that he performed
a surgical procedure which relieved the gastro-enteritis
caused by the food poisoning incident and that she made
an excellent recovery. He testified that she was in the
hospital no more than eight days and was discharged
without any symptoms. This operation was performed
on May 27, 1962. (R. 130, 131) He testified that thereafter he communicated with her by telephone and that
she made a good recovery. At the time of this surgical
operation the doctor testified that he also performed an
exploratory operation, and as of that time made a determination that there was no cancer present. (R. 131)
Concerning Mrs. Pritchett's physical condition, following the surgery of May, 1962, the doctor testified as
follows: ( R. 133, 134)

5

"Q If you had been asked to give an opinion
as to Mrs. Pritchett's physical condition follow.
ing the time when she was hospitalized for this
surgery, stomach surgery in 1962, following her
release from the hospital and based on reporb
to you, what would your opinion have been?

"A

Her condition was very good at that time.

"Q So far as you were concerned was she in
excellent health?

"A That is right. The subsequent history is
one of the things or the prejudices that we see all
over A~erica so far as cancer is concerned.
"Q Is there any way you have of accounting
for how this cancer happened?

"A

I wish I knew the answer to that.

"Q Other than the normal incidents of age,
taking Mrs. Pritchett as she was following this
stomach surgery, other than the ordinary inci·
dents of age, would you think that she was a good
risk as far as medical insurance was concerned!

"A

I would say she was.

"Q Do you have an opinion as to whether or
not she was a good risk as far as health insurance
is concerned?

"A

Yes, for her age group."

Mr. Pritchett testified that at the time the applications for the insurance policies were made out that
he and l\frs. Pritchett told Nell Bailey about all of
Mrs. Pritchett's prior medical history, including the
surgery following the food poisoning incident. He fur-
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ther stated that they even informed Mrs. Bailey about
the trip by airplane to Salt Lake for the operation and
that they furnished her with the names of the doctors
in Salt Lake and Phoenix, to which Mrs. Bailey answered:
"That will be sufficient." (R. 73, 74)
Nell Bailey testified by way of deposition that she
recalled the incident when the application blanks were
filled out by her for Mrs. Pritchett. She stated that Mrs.
Pritchett had told her about prior operations which she
felt were too remote to be of interest to the insurance
company, and that she informed her of a food poisoning
incident. Mrs. Bailey was questioned concerning an affidavit which she had signed on December 10, 1963, reading in part as follows: (Ex. 3 to Deposition)

"*** that during the time of my making of the

application, as I said, Mary Pritchett told me
that she had had operations more than three years
previous thereto; that I made no reference to said
operations on the application because they occurred over three years prior to the date of the
application with one exception, which involved
an operation performed on Mary Pritchett on
or about May 27, 1962; that I was fully informed
of the circumstances of this operation, but made
no reference to the same, specifically, because I
was also informed that it related to a food poisoning which the said application had already stated
she had been treated for elsewhere in the application and from which she had fully recovered at
the time of the execution of said application."
7

Mrs. Bailey was questioned about the above language after said language was repeated, as follows:
(R. 98)
"Now, my question is: Is what you said in that
affidavit that I have just now read - is what you
said in that affidavit that I just now read, correct
in all respects?
"A If it pertains to this paragraph where 1
have this medical information, yes.
"Q

Well, does it?

"A Yes, it applies to this period. This is the ·
food poisoning period.
"Q You are now pointing to, under para·
graph 9-a, where it says: '2-28-62, food poisoning,
ate tainted meat at restaurant, completely re·
covered.' Then next to that the doctor is listed
as McKeown, and his address, as you have already
stated?

"A

That's right."

Mrs. Bailey further testified as to the procedure
the company goes through when it receives these appli· ,
cations.
"Q When the company gets it, the claims
department, they usually investigate any medical
history that you put on a patient within the last
three years; that they investigate. From your
experience as a saleslady for this company, was
that their usual method of proceeding?

"A Indeed. And if it needed a rider to be
put on the policy, they always put a rider on it.
The claims took it - the underwriters, I should
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say, took it before they issued the policy, and they
investigated, and if they needed a rider to be put
on it, they issued a rider when you got the policy.
"Q But there was no rider that was placed on
these policies?

"A

No, no.

"Q Now, who is it in the company that usually
makes these investigations?

"A She is the head of the underwriters.
J\ir. Ross: Claire Dewey?
"A

Claire Dewey."

Mrs. Bailey further testified as to her work for
defendant company and as to the discretion given to her
by the company and the confidence shown in her by
the company: (R. 101)
"Q Did you, while working for this company,
customarily when taking these applications, not
list any operations that were more than three
years before?

"It is according to the operation. For ten years
I have been in the insurance business, and I have
never been questioned about my underwriting.
So I have managed offices and hired agents and
trained them. A gall bladder operation, it was no
malignancy, is immaterial fourteen years ago.
An appendix operation, something that isn't a cancer operation, something that serious, even
if it has been five years ago, you still - or how
long ago - you list it. But something - if you
had an ingrown toenail taken off or your tonsils
taken out, usually companies aren't interested in
that kind of information.

9

"Q Did the company give you a certain
amount of discretion as an agent in what you
put-

"A

Yes.

"Q cations?

in and what not to put in these appli-

"A Yes. I have never been questioned in ten
years about my underwriting by the insurance
department or any company."
Mrs. Bailey further testified that she put her husband's name on the policies to help him win a prize,
which he did. (R. Ill, 112)

1

Defendant offered into evidence a specimen of a
rider which defendant's witness claimed would have
been attached to the Pritchett policy if complete infor·
mation had been known by the company. (See Exhibit
12) The rider excepted the following:
"I. Stomach ulcer, disease or operation involv-

ing the stomach, pylorous or duodenum,

2. Intestinal obstruction or any digestive dis- '

ease or disturbance, adhesions, hernia, or

3. Any disease or disorder of the biliary tract,
and/or
4. Any cardio-vascular disease."

The court ruled in favor of plaintiff in a memoran·
dum decision. (R. 9-11) In the court's Amended Fino·
ings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the court rulecl
as follows, in part: ( R. 44-46)
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"4. That the applicant's application for said
insurance policy was prepared by the agent, Nell
Bailey at the home of Leon G. Pritchett and
_Mary H. Pritchett and duly signed by ::Mary H.
Pritchett on November 28, 1962; that at the time
and place Mary H. Pritchett was aware of the
fact that she had failed to make a full disclosure
of all the medical history concerning her past
medical history in the application submitted to
the company, but had so indicated to the agent,
Nell Bailey, that such was so, and left the policy
application in the form submitted in the hope
of receiving coverage that would not have been
granted had she insisted on a full medical history
being covered; that Nell Bailey, the agent of
the Defendant, in the course of her employment
was also aware that a full disclosure had not been
made and encouraged Mary H. Pritchett not to
include any other information and nevertheless
prepared and submitted the application for the
insurance policy in question, Nell Bailey prepared
and sent in the application for the insurance
policy in question, the Defendant company encouraged incomplete disclosure of medical history
by providing a form with grossly inadequate
space provided for the information sought and
with reasonable care either knew or should have
known that it was highly probable that the form
in question did not contain a full medical history
but was willing to extend coverage on the application with a desire to accept the premiums that
it likley wouldn't have received had it insisted
on full disclosure of medical history and the resulting elaborate exclusion from coverage that
would follow, but relied on the possibility of gaining advantage by claiming policy defenses in case
of illness.

11

"5. That had a full disclosure been made to

Defendant company the company would have
attached a rider which would have excluded benefits resulting from disease of the alimentary
canal; that Mary H. Pritchett died of a cancerous
condition .which affected the alimentary canal,
but no evidence was presented as to the origin
of the cancer and therefore the court is unable
to find that Mary H. Pritchett died of a disease
of the alimentary canal, other than that her death
was secondary to a general spread of cancer
throughout the abdominal area; that had a rider
been attached to the policy, excluding diseases
of the alimentary canal, said rider would not have
excluded medical expenses resulting from cancer
of an undisclosed origin from which Mary H.
Pritchett died."
And the following Conclusions of Law, in part:
"2. That Defendant has no available policy
defense as to plaintiff's claims on the insurance
policies in question, even though all parties have
unclean hands, for the reason that the company
has encouraged inadequate and incomplete re·
porting of past conditions of health.
"3. In any event, any omissions on the part of
Mary H. Pritchett in regard to information con·
cerning her past condition of health were imma·
terial omissions in the case at bar for the reason
that full knowledge would not have resulted in
a rider excluding the claim in question.

"4. The aforesaid Conclusions of Law accord
with public policy considerations in check~ng
medical insurance companies from encouragm~
insufficient and inadequate information on appl 1•
cation blanks."
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ARGUlHEN'l'
POINT I
THE INSURANCE COlUPANY \VAIVED
ANY POLICY DEFENSES IT .MAY HAVE
HAD.
There being competent evidence supporting the
findings of the trial court, said findings cannot be disturbed on appeal. See Searnons v. Andersen, et al.,
(1952) 122 Utah 497, 252 P.2d 209; Buckley v. Co:r,
122 Utah 151, 247 P.2d 277; Jensen v. Gerrard, 85
Utah 481, 39 P.2d 1070.
Appellant in its brief has blithely accused IVIary
Pritchett of fraud and mistakenly claims that the trial
court found her guilty of fraud. This is not true. Had
defendant read the case of Pace v. Parrish, (1952) 122
Utah 141, 247 P.2d 273, it would have found that there
are nine elements which a party must prove before he
l'an prove fraud. Since defendant alleged fraud, its burden was to prove it by clear and convincing evidence.
See Condas v. Adams, 15 Utah 2d 132, 388 P.2d 803.
This, defendant failed to do, and the trial court did not
so find. The balance of this brief will deal specifically
with defendant's failures in this regard.

A - DEFENDANT'S AGENT \VAS FULLY INFOR.MED - HER KNO\VLEDGE IS
IMPUTED TO THE COMP ANY.
There can be no question but that knowledge oblainecl by defendant's agent, Nell Bailey, in the course
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of her employment as an insurance agent, is imputed
to and becomes the knowledge of the defendant insur.
ance company. Accordingly, defendant was charged
with knowing what Nell Bailey knew. The general
rule is stated at 29-A Am.J ur., INSURANCE, par.
1019, at page 192:
"The general rule of agency that the principal
is charegable with, and is bound by, the knowledge of or notice to his agent received while the
agent is acting within the scope of his authority,
and which is in reference to a matter over which
his authority extends, is fully applicable to agents ,
of insurance companies. The general rule of insurance law is that the knowledge of, or notice
to, an insurance agent as to a matter within the
scope of his authority, and which is acquired
while the agent is acting within the scope of his
authority, is charegable to the insurer. The
agent's knowledge is in law the knowledge of the
insurer, although such knowledge is not in fact
communicated to the insurer.
·
"By imputing the agent's knowledge of violation of policy conditions to the insurance com·
pany, the latter has the knowledge necessary to
relinquish a known right under the theory of '
waiver. This rule of imputation of knowledge is
not based upon the theory of actual notice but
rather on considerations of policy, namely, that
where one seeks the advantages of doing business
through general agents, fairness to the other
party demands that the principal be in no better
position than if he were transacting the business
in person."
This rule has been followed in Utah. See Bednarek
v. Brotherhood of Arnerican Yeomen, 38 Utah 67, 157
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P. 38,t; Farrington v. Granite State Fire Insurance
CumJHlll!J of Portsrnouth, ct al., ( 1951) 120 Utah 109;
23:2 P.2cl 754. Also the following authorities from other
jurisdictions:
Van Ross v. Metropolitan Insurance Cornpany,
134' Kan. 479, 7 P.2d 41;
Finkle v. lV cstcrn

~

Southern Life I rum ranee Co.,

171 Ohio 495, 172 N.E.2d 311;

Pfiester v. Insurance Co., 85 Kan. 97, 116 P. 245;
F'arrners ~Bankers Life Insurance Co. v. Baxley,
202 Okl. 531, 215 P.2d 941; and
Rocky Mountain Fire ~ Casualty Co. v. Rose,
(1963) 62 'V ash. 2d 896, 385 P .2d 45.
A case somewhat similar to the case at bar is the
ease of Farrners ~ Bankers Life Insurance Co. v. Baxle!J, supra. In that case the applicant disclosed to the
agent a history of female disorders and a prior operation
for female trouble. The agent told her that this was a
minor matter of no consequence and accordingly did not
include her statement in the application, which he filled
out and she signed. The court held that the policy was
not voidable for fraud under the general rule as stated
above. For a good statement of the general rule, see
Appleman, INSURANCE LAW & PRACTICE,
Vol. 17. Par. 9401, at page 1, where it is stated as
follows:
"An insurer cannot avoid a policy by taking
advantage of a misstatement in the application,
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material to the risk, not due to the insured's bad
faith. It is the duty of an agent for an insurance
company to prepare the papers under his supervision so that they will accurately and truthfully
state the result of the negotiations, and the agent~s
failure to do so is, in legal effect, the fault of the
company. Thus, the insurer's agent owes it a duty
to correctly record the answers to questions co~.
tained in the application."
It is further stated in Appleman, Vol. I 7, par.
940I, at p. II:

"Even knowledge on the part of the insured ,
that the insurer's agent is acting adversely to the
insurer, without participation in such action by
the insured with fraudulent intent, does not pre·
vent the agent's knowledge from being imputed
to the insurer. Accordingly, under these rules,
even if matters are misrepresented in an applica·
tion, and the insured is at fault in some respect
for such misstatements, if the agent had actual
knowledge of the true situation concerning which
the misrepresentation was made, or knew that
such statements were false, the company cannot
defend upon the basis of their falsity. And the
contention of the insurer, which had refused pay·
ment because of fraud in misstating facts in pro·
curing the policy, that its knowledge of the falsity
of a statement made, being only partial, would
not relieve the taint of fraud, was considered un·
meritorious.''
According to the record in this case, Mrs. Pritchett
and her husband fully informed the agent, Nell Bailey,
of her past medical history. The testimony of Nell
Bailey corroborates the testimony of Leon G. Pritchett
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on this matter. Leon Pritchett testified that Nell Bailey
was fully informed, and that she made the decision as
to how the application was filled out. Nell Bailey admitted that she was told of the prior operations, which
she considered too remote to be of importance to the
insurance company, and further she admitted that she
was told of the food poisoning incident and its results,
but that since the applicant stated that she had made a
complete recovery, she did not go into detail. There was
not one shred of evidence that Mrs. Pritchett withheld
information or misstated any facts.
The fact that Mrs. Pritchett was in good health
for a woman of her age, was corroborated by the testimony of Dr. Stevenson, who knows more about Mrs.
Pritchett's condition at the time in question than any
other person. Dr. Stevenson testified that Mary Pritchett made a complete recovery from the surgery in May
of 1962 and that her progress was fallowed by him
thereafter by telephone conversations. He testified that
as part of the same operation, he performed an exploratory procedure and found no cancer. He testified that
following the operation, Mary Pritchett was a good
risk for health insurance. This evidence shows beyond
any doubt that at the time the application was made
for this insurance, Mary Pritchett was in good health
and indeed had made a complete recovery from the
food poisoning incident of February, 1962.
Such information having been furnished, Nell
Railey had the absolute right to proceed as far as she
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desired with this inquiry. Nell Bailey had sold insurance
for approximately ten years and testified that she had
never had any problems over any of her applicatiou 1
and that the company had faith in her as an insurance
agent. Her knowledge was imputed to the company,
and the company waived any defenses it could have ha<l
for incomplete information on the application blank.
B - THERE WAS NO INTENT TO DEFRAUD ON TIIE PART OF MARY PRITCH.
ETT.
It is clear that the law in Utah is that mere falsity
of answers to questions propounded is insufficient, if
not knowingly made with intent to deceive and defraud.
See Wootten v. Combined Insurance Co. of America
(1964) 16 Utah 2d 52, 395 P.2d 724;

v. Bene.ficial Life Insurance Co., 54 Utah
443, 181 P. 448;

Chadwick~

New Y orl-c Life Insurance Co.
135 P.2d 120;

'V.

Grow, 103 Utah 285,

Zolintakis v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 10 Cir.,
97 F .2d 583, 108 F .2d 902;
Prudential Insurance Co. of America v. Willsey, 10
Cir., 214 F.2d 729.
Defendant failed to prove any such fraudulent in·
tent on the part of Mary Pritchett.
18

1. THE AGENT

USED HER DISCRETION IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE AUTHORITY GRANTED TO HER BY THE
COMPANY IN FILLING OUT THE FORMS.
Concerning the trust which the insurance company
reposed in Nell Bailey, which was not disputed by the
defendant, Nell Bailey testified at R. 101:
"It is according to the operation. For ten years
I have been in the insurance business, and I have
never been questioned about my underwriting.
So I have managed offices and hired agents and
trained them. A gall bladder operation, it was
no malignancy, is immaterial fourteen years ago.
An appendix operation, something that isn't a
cancer operation, something that serious, even if
it has been five years ago, you still - or how long
ago, you list it. But something - if you had an
ingrown toenail taken off or your tonsils taken
out, usually companies aren't interested in that
kind of information.

"Q · Did the company give you a certain
amount of discretion as an agent in what you
put-

"A Yes.
"Q cations?

in and what not to put in these appli-

"A Yes. I have never been questioned in ten
years about my underwriting by the insurance
department of any company."
Certainly a person with no knowledge out of the
ordinary concerning the msurance business applying
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for an insurance policy and doing business with an experienced agent, can rely on the agent knowing her
business and knowing how to fill out answers to questions in the application form. Mary Pritchett and her
husband could rely on Nell Bailey knowing what to put
in and what not to put in. On this subject it is stated
in Appleman, INSURANCE LAW & PRACTICE,
Vol. 17, par. 9402, at p. 13:
"Accordingly, when the facts stated by an
applicant to an authorized agent are disregarded
by the latter as not material, the insurer is
estopped to rely upon such facts to defeat a
recovery. And where the facts are fully disclosed
by the applicant, the failure of the agent to make
the application contain such information or his
omission of certain of such material facts there·
from is chargeable to the insurer, and not to the
insured.
"Similarly, where an agent advises the insured
what facts are material, an omission will not viti·
ate the policy where the applicant has acted in
good faith. *** And where an agent propounds
a prescribed categorical list of questions and
leaves out such answers as would work a refusal
of the policy, and the insurer issues a policy, it,
and not the insured, is responsible for the situ·
ation so arising."
It is stated at 29-A Am. J ur., INSURANCE,
par. 1059, at p. 226:

"In cases in which a soliciting or other auth_or·
ized insurance agent, in the course of prepar~1g
an application, suggests an answer to a questwn
20

therein or interprets its meaning and effect, the
insurer is responsible for the insertion of the false
answer, on the theory that the agent, in recording
facts stated by the applicant when making out
au application for a policy of insurance, acts as
the agent of the company rather than of the
insured, so that his acts, representations, and
mistakes are those of the insurance company.
Thus, where there are no circumstances to arouse
the suspicions of an applicant who reveals a history of previous illness to the agent, and the agent
advises the applicant that such illness is of no
importance, the law does not require the applicant
to go further and question the authority or judgment of the agent to decide whether the information is sufficiently important to merit consideration in the application."
Nell Bailey is the one who decided what was to
be put in the application. She was the one entrusted
by defendant to perform this function. Not only is the
knowledge which she received imputed to the company,
but the company is charged with any errors and omissions made by Nell Bailey in the course of her employment and cannot charge Mary Pritchett with fraud
when it was Nell Bailey who made the omissions of which
defendant so vehemently complains. Natural justice
as well as the settled law cries out at the injustice of
defendant charging Mary Pritchett with fraud.
2. THE COMPANY ENCOURAGED

INSUFFICIENT ANSWERS BY PROVIDING
F'ORMS WITH INADEQUATE SPACE FOR
THE INFORlVIATION SOUGHT.
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The trial court was impressed with this argument
and made a specific finding on it. In its Amended FinJ.
ings the court held in part: ( R. 45)
"The defendant company encouraged incom.
plete disclosure of medical history by providi11 o
a form with grossly inadequate space provideJ
for the information sought and with reasonablt
care either knew or should have known that it
was highly probable that the form in question
did not contain a full medical history but wa1
willing to extend coverage on the application
with a desire to accept the premiums that it likell
wouldn't have received had it insisted on fuil
disclosure of medical history and the resulting
elaborate exclusion from coverage that would
follow, but relied on the possibility of gaining
advantage .PY claiming policy defenses in case
of illness."

It is submitted that the court is holding in thf
aforesaid finding that defendant company did not in
fact rely upon the information furnished in the appli·
cation forms with inadequate space for complek
answers, and further that the company has waived an)
defenses it might otherwise have for omissions from
said application blank.
The court also stated, at a discussion following the
presentation of the case, at R. 175:
"THE COURT: The agent, yes. And I fur
ther find that the way this was conducted, obr1:
ously from these forms, that the company wei'
knew that the agent was given full informat.wn
But they didn't give you enough informat 1011
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that it obvious - any person who gives you three
lines and you are supposed to give them all of
this information. 'Have you or any dependent
members of your family ever been treated for or
to the best of your know ledge and belief ever had
any of the following: hernia, high blood pressure,
epilepsy, syphilis, fainting spells, dizziness, rheumatism, sugar or albumen, tuberculosis, ***,
throat or any other illnesses, operation or injury? - State in full detail.' You can not tell
what is wrong w~th an eight-year-old boy in three
lines. I think the policy ought to be written for
defenses.''
Accordingly, the trial court, based on the nature of
the application forms. (Exhibit 3, 4) has specifically
found that the company itself has encouraged inadequate and insufficient answers to the questions on its
application forms. This amounts to a finding that
defendant has waived any defense for insufficient
answers and that it should be estopped from claiming
any defense for the inadequacy that it has encouraged.
3. AP P L I CAN T

FURNISHED ADEQUATE INFORMATION TO MAKE IT EASY
F'OR THE COMPANY TO MAKE FURTHER
INQUIRY IF IT DESIRED - DEFENDANT
IS CHARGED WITH THE INFORMATION
A REASONABLE INQUIRY WOULD HAVE
REVEALED.
The application form furnished adequate information to allow defendant company to easily make inquiry
concerning the food poisoning incident and its sequelre.
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The application blank contained the name of the doct 01
who treated Mrs. Pritchett, together with his addres
in Phoenix, Arizona. A phone call would have reveale1J
any further information desired by defendant. Thi~.
defendant chose not to do. This brings to mind a state.
ment contained in the case of Wootten v. CombineJ
Insurance Company of America, supra, at page 726:

1

"The failure of respondent to volunteer the in·
formation that her husband had resigned his jof.
in July because with the added work his weal
leg was being a~versely affected cannot reason·
ably be considered as sufficient evidence upor
which to base a finding of intent to defraua
Appellant had sufficient knowledge of the phys1
cal disability of respondent's husband to ascerta!r
all the facts it needed as to its extent, if it baa
deemed it important, by either asking further
questions or conducting an investigation; ani
it cannot blind itself from ascertaining the trull
and then claim willful misrepresentation of fn,
truth on which it relied in order to avoid payme11'
under a policy. This would appear to be espe
cially applicable in the instant case where tl1t
accidental death of respondent's husband was nn
in any way related to his physical defect." (Italil·
ours.)
This court in the Wootten case held that the insur·
ance company has certain duties which it must perform
It cannot stand idly by and then claim def ens es fo:
omissions which it could have easily avoided. This dub
is clearly stated at 29-A Am. Jur., INSURANCf
par. 1026, at page 199:
24
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1

"The rule that whatever puts a person on inquiry, amounts, in law, to notice of such facts
as an inquiry pursued with ordinary diligence
and understanding would have disclosed is applicable, according to some authority, to charge
an insurer with notice. This is in line with the
general rule followed by the majority of the
courts that have passed upon the question, that
the principal is charged with the knowledge of
that which his agent, by ordinary care, could have
known, where the agent has received sufficient
information to awaken inquiry."

Not only did Nell Bailey have sufficient information to awaken her to a duty of making further
inquiry if she desired, but the company on the form
l itself had adequate information to put it on a duty of
1 inquiry to make further investigation. A simple telephone call would have revealed any additional information that the company desired concerning the food
', poisoning incident and its sequalre.
Nell Bailey clearly focused this duty in her testimony at R. 96:
"A No. She said they ran a thing down into
her stomach. I don't know enough about operations to know the procedures of the doctor. But
she said they had to run down into her stomach
and pump this food out, and she almost died.
And she didn't know what they called the operation, so I put the doctor's name down and his
address where he may be contacted by the company."
And again, R. 97:
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"A Well, in our applications we usually pt;
the doctor's name and his address so that the cur
pany can go into that. Their claims departme
usually goes into that.
11

11

"Q

Does the company usually investigate!

"A

Yes, indeed.

"Q

-

there applications?

"A Yes, indeed. If there is a medical histor
like this, they usually go into it."
·
Appelman, Vol. 1, par. 220, p. 359, states:

"On the other hand, an insurer cannot con:
placently rely upon statements made by the u:
sured where the type of information is of a char
acter suggesting a cautionary investigation as I
the accuracy of the statement given. And wher
the insured discloses that he has undergone :1
operation and furnishes the company with ti
name of the attending physician, it has amp!
information from which to investigate furtht
and cannot complain that the insured failed I
relate an illness ensuing upon such operatio1
Furthermore, if the general nature of the di1 o
order is stated, no more ample details need!
given, in the absence of inquiry."
POINT II
THE CLAIMED FRAUDULENT
CEALMENTS ARE IMMATERIAL.

cm

The Utah statutes require that a misrepresen•t !1
tion or concealment must pertain to a "material far:
in order to give defendant a defense. Sec. 31-10-'
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1,

Ftah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended in 1963, states

11

as follows:

"*** Misrepresentations, om1ss10ns, concealment of facts, and incorrect statements shall not
prevent a recovery under the policy or contract
unless:

Ii

" (a) Fraudulent; or

If',
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" ( b) lVIaterial either to the hazard assumed by
the insurer; or
" (c) The insurer in good faith either would
not have issued the policy or contract, or would
not have issued, reinstated, or renewed it at the
same premium rate, or would not have issued,
reinstated, or renewed a policy or contract in as
large an amount, or would not have provided
coverage with respect to the hazard resulting in
the loss, if the true facts had been made known to
the insurer as required either by the application
for the policy or contract or otherwise." (Italics
ours.)

Section 31-19-8 as it existed prior to the enactment
Iii of 1963, reads in part as follows :

01

"The falsity of any such statement shall not
bar the right to recovery under the contract unless it materially affected either the acceptance
of the risk or the hazard assumed by the insurer."
The court specifically found that the concealments
complained of were not material to the risk assumed
1L hy the insurance company and therefore could not afford
r the basis for a defense. The court held in Finding of
l·' Fat:t No. 5: (R. 45)
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"That had a full disclosure been made to dtfendant company the company would have attached a rider which would have excluded benetil\
resulting from disease of the alimentary canal:
that :Mary H. Pritchett died of a canceruu 1
condition which affected the alimentary canal, but
no evidence was presented as to the origin of thr
cancer and therefore, the court is unable to find
that .Mary H. Pritchett died of a disease of the
alimentary canal, other than that her death wa1
secondary to a general spread of cancer throughout the abdominal area; that had a rider been
attached to the policy, excluding diseases of thf
alimentary canal, said rider would not have excluded medical expenses resulting from cancer
of an undisclosed origin from which l\1ary H.
Pritchett died."
And in Conclusion of Law No. R: (R. 46)
In any event, any omissions on the part 01
:Mary H. Pritchett in regard to information con·
cerning her past condition of health were immaterial omissions in the case at bar for th'
reason that full knowledge would not have re·
sulted in a rider excluding the claim in question
The foregoing Finding of Fact and Conclusion ni
Law by the court were amply supported by the en
deuce in the case. Instead of a situation where a corn·
pany either accepts a risk or does not accept a rish
the defendant in writing the type of insurance polic.1
in question could accept the general risk and prott
itself as to specific conditions by attaching riders. I'
this case the evidence showed that the defendant, en
with full information, would have still issued the po\i,
1
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hut would have attached a rider excluding diseases of
the alimentary canal. The court specifically found that
~Iary H. Pritchett did not die of any such disease but
of cancer of an undisclosed origin. Accordingly, even
bad the rider been attached to this policy, Mary H.
Pritchett's claim would have still been payable. This
situation falls squarely within the requirements of the
Utah Statutes and general case law that concealment
of a fact not material will not avoid a policy claim. The
Wouttcn case, supra, is a good example of a claimed
omission being immaterial.

er
l

Another Utah case which held that a claimed misrepresentation was not material to the risk is the Farrington case, supra. In that case the defendant asserted
that the representation that the building was occupied
as a skating rink was a fraudulent misrepresentation,
Ol
in· whereas ,the true fact was that at the time of the applim· uition for insurance, part of the building was dismantled
he
and the building was vacant. The court stated in part
re·
as to the requirement that the misrepresentation be
1.
lllaterial at page 118:
Ol

m-

sk

11

:e·

"There is no evidence in the record that the
fact that the building was partly dismantled and
vacant would increase the risk of fire loss. Although generally a vacant building has a greater
hazard of loss by fire, the fact that the electric
power had been cut off and there was no danger
from smoking by skating patrons might indicate
to the contrary. From ought we know, it is as
likely that there was lesser risk as it is that there
was ·greater. At least there is no evidence from
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which we can determine that even if there ha
been concealment or misrepresentation that r
was material to the risk."

1

In Appleman, INSURANCE LA\V & PRAl
1
TICE, Vol. 1, par. 214, p. 325, it is stated:
"Some courts have held that in order to pn
vent a recovery on the basis of misrepresentatio:
as to present health or prior disease, it is necessar,
to show that the misrepresentation was of~
material matter and induced the issuance of ti:·
contract. Following that rule, it would be M
that the risk itself must be actually affected, an
unless the matter concealed and misstated woul
have a tendency to increase the risk or to shorle'
the life, the policy must not be avoided."
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The evidence on which the trial court relied in ti
case at bar specifically showed that the defendant woul
have accepted the risk but would have merely attacht 'l
a rider which would not have eliminated the claim~ n
a
question.
h:
The case of Hale v. Sovereign Camp WOW, 11 h:
Tenn. 555, 226 S.W. 1045, involved a representatir IL
that the applicant had not consulted a physician durin. ft
the preceding five years. The court held that this 11~
insufficient to defeat the action on the benefit certificat
('
though during such time he had summoned a dod
during an attack of asthma from which he prompt 11
recovered and though during such time he had procurr P
a prescription from a doctor to reduce his flesh at a tu: ·i
when he was not sick, where the death was caused
influenza, since such representations were as to rnattr '11
1

1

·''
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Jiid1 in no way contributed either directly or indirectly
to his death.

1,

11

r

The case of Clegg v. John Ha,ncock Mutual Life
' insurance Campany, Mo. App. 1940, 141 S.,V.2d 143,
was au action on a life policy in which there was evit dence that the insured had been treated for glandular
J: trouble in 1936 and 1937 and that he died from cancer
n iu 1!)38. \Vhen he applied for the insurance policy, he
'. stated that he had not received treatment for diseases
11
•le mentioned, including cancer, and had not within five
n years been treated for any other disease. The court
held that if the disease for which he was treated did
er
uot cause or contribute to his death, the misrepresentation was not material to the risk.
1

1

1

e
u

n.
1'~

In People's Mutual Life Association v. Cavender,
Tex., Civ. App. 1932, 46 S.W.2d 723, the insured represented in an application that he had never undergone
a surgical operation, notwithstanding the fact that he
had a prior operation for sinus trouble from which he
had entirely recovered. The court held that such a
illisrepresentation was not material and denied the defense submitted by defendant.

Also see Poignee v. Monumental Life Insurance
Co., Mo. App. 1945, 157 S.W.2d 531; Sovereign Camp
WOTV v. Gibbs, 217 Ala. 108, 114 So. 915; Metrorr politan Life Ins1irance Co. v. Rowe, 69 Ga. App. 192,
n ~4 S.E.2d 826; Wells v. Jefferson Standard Life Inxuran1·e Co., 211 N.C. 427, 190 S.E. 744, (Statement
r ill application for life policy that applicant had not
1
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consulted a doctor for any cause not included in pr,
vious answers held not a material representation sut.
as to avoid policy, though about a month previou~;
applicant had consulted a physician with reference 1
half a degree of malarial fever of mild type wher,
applicant's death was not traceable to malaria); P1l
dential ln.Yurance Co. v. Seller.~, 54 Ind. App. 326, IO.
N. E. 894, (Requires that treatment be for some au d
ment which seriously affects the health of the insured. ii
An Idaho case which is helpful is the case r.
Ru.Ysell v. New York Life Insurance Co., (1922) i·
Idaho 774, 209 P. 273. In that case the Supreme Cour
affirmed a judgment against an insurer on a policy o
life insurance where it appeared that the insured ha
stated in his application for such policy that he ha
never suffered any ailment of the stomach, that he ha
not consulted a physician for any other ailment '
disease not included in answers to specific questiorr
and that he had not consulted any physician or ph~
sicians within five years. The evidence showed that mo1
than two years before the issuance of the policy, tl
insured had consulted a physician, who was a medic
examiner for several insurers, complaining of indigt
tion and overwork, that the patient acting upon t!
advice of his physician took a rest of a month or )
but a year later the patient returned to the physici:'
complaining of practically the same thing, and that ti
physician then examined him very carefully and four
that he had nothing more than gastric neurosis, wk
was nothing serious and would not in any way shor'
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cxpedancy of life. The evidence further showed
that the cause of death was an automobile accident.
hi~

The court stated that even if the applicant had
answered the questions truthfully, the practice of the
medical examiners who have been to make an inquiry
of the physician who had treated the applicant with
special reference to whether there was a malignant
disease or ulcers of the stomach or intestines; and that
if the inquiry had been made of the physician, the
medical examiners would have discovered nothing which
would have materially affected the risk, so that the
insurance contract would have been issued in spite of
the disclosure of such treatment.

In dealing with the question of materiality, the
.a Supreme Court of Tennessee in the case of Interstate
13
Life & Accident Co. v. Potter, 17 Tenn. App. 381, 68
S.W.2d 119, stated that a misrepresentation would be
ri material if it would naturally and reasonably influence
11
the insurer and induce it to decline the application.
JI The court quoted the following language from another
tl Tennessee case :
1

't•

"It is not to be left to the insurance company to
say after a death has occurred that it would or
would not have issued the policy had the answer
been truly given. It is true the practice of an
insurance company with respect to particular information may be looked to in determining whether it would naturally and reasonably influence
the judgment of the insurer, but no sound principle of law would permit a determination of this
question merely upon the say-so of the company
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after the death has occurred. The matter 1111 , iii
represented must be of that character which ti, hi
court can say would reasonably affect the irr
surer's judgment."
th
The court went on to hold a misrepresentation nr
material where it appeared that in reply to the reque,
in the medical examination: "Name below all caust
for which you have consulted a physician in the pa'
ten years," the insured noted one instance of influem
lasting a short time and having no permanent effer
It appeared that in the same year in which insured hr.,
had the attack of influenza, he had also consulted ti.
same physician and then subsequently a second phys
cian, who diagnosed his trouble as a low-grade pyelit
or inflammation or infection in the kidney-pelvis, tr
gether with systitis or inflammation or infection of tL
prostate gland, such an infection apparently being di,
to colon bacillus, which were not serious unless tllf
developed into some other ailment; that the secon
physician treated him on nine different occasions a11
then gave a letter to insured's regular physician cot
cerning the ailment and treatment therefor; that ti
treatment consisted of injections of urotropine into
vein for the purpose of washing out the kidneys a[
removing pus therefrom. The insured died about a ye:,
after the issuance of the policy from cancer of the liH
It appeared also that he had diabetes. The insured''
active at his work during the period of treatment pn
to the application for his policy, and his physician, wi
saw him nearly e''ery day, as he went to and froill !
work, considered the insured to be in good health :i'
34
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iliil not include the consultations for the infection in

ti, his report as medical examiner because he considered
III them as minor troubles which had passed away.

In conformity with the spirit of the general law
ue, and case law heretofore cited, the determination of
list materiality cannot be left in the insurance company's
pa' hands to come to court and state whether or not an
:m. omission or misrepresentation is material. The trial
'er court in this case has specifically found that the claimed
I11.' omission was as to an immaterial fact.
ti.
The only possible omission which could be claimed
iys by defendant is the fact that the application does not
H contain details as to the operation in May of 1962,
caused by the food poisoning incident of February,
tL 1962. If the company had had full information, it would
dL hare merely ascertained that this stomach operation
tllf was caused by the food poisoning incident and was
~0 11 successfully handled by Dr. Stevenson. It would have
all also found that Dr. Stevenson made a specific finding
cot at that time, pursuant to exploratory procedures, that
ti there was no cancer in the abdominal area of Mary H.
to Pritchett. It would have also found that Mary H.
a[ Pritchett made a full and complete recovery from this
\·e:, surgical procedure and that at the time of the issuance
iH of the policy, she was in good health and was indeed
11
a good insurance risk.
111

lfi'

Defendant failed utterly to sustain its burden of
! proring by clear and convincing evidence that the
1
:i'
''lJeration of May, 1962, had any connection at all with
I

\\'I
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her death from cancer of an undisclosed origin. Ti~
court has so found, and the court's finding is support~:
by the record.
CONCLUSION
The judgment of the trial court is supported o:
competent evidence in the record. The evidence show!
that defendant's agent, Nell Bailey, was fully inforrne(
of Mary H. Pritchett's prior medical history. T·
evidence shows that the company was given adequal
information to make further inquiry if it had desir
The evidence shows that the claimed omission was·
material to the risk assumed by the company, and tha
if the company had complete information, the most:
would have done would have been to attach a rid
which would not have excluded the claim in questio
The evidence shows that complete information int
hands of the insurance company would have shown thi
Mary H. Pritchett was in good health at the timer
the issuance of the policy, and that she had made a co
plete recovery from the surgery of May, 1962. D
fendant failed utterly to prove by clear and convinc'
evidence that Mary H. Pritchett was guilty of frau·
Respectfully submitted,
JOHN L. BLACK
RAWLINGS, 'VALLACE, ROBERT)
& BLACK
530 Judge Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Respondent
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